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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are living in a world of increasingly complicated and transient 
technology, a world that lends itself to scientific achievements capable 
of fundamentally altering the human condition. 1 Intellectual property 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University School of Law (beginning fall 
1997). I would like to thank Harold Edgar, Clarisa Long, Dennis Patterson, and Kathleen 
Rogers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article. I also wish to 
acknowledge Judge Giles S. Rich, for whom I have had the honor of clerking and from 
whom I have learned a great deal about our patent system. 
l. Nearly forty years ago, Hannah Arendt spoke of the "conditioning force" that is 
brought into our world by human endeavor: 
Whatever enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into 
it by human effort becomes part of the human condition. The impact 
of the world's reality upon human existence is felt and received as a 
conditioning force. The objectivity of the world- its object- or 
thing-character- and the human condition supplement each other; 
because human existence is conditioned existence, it would be 
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law, especially patent law, is instrumental to the advancement of this 
technology.2 Indeed, the languages of patent law and technology are 
inextricably linked so that discourse within one requires fluency in the 
other.3 Of particular significance is that each technology possesses its 
own language that forms part of a -unique relationship between the 
various technologies and the patent laws. It is these relationships that are 
relevant to· patent validity determinations whereby patent claim language, 
technological practice, 4 and the patent code all have a role to play. 
The fundamental question this Article addresses is who should be 
primarily responsible for making patent validity determinations: the 
courts5 or the Patent and Trademark Office ('PT0")?6 Which entity 
impossible without such things, and things would be a heap of 
unrelated articles, a non-world, if they were not the conditioners of 
human existence. 
HANNAH ARENDT, 'DIEHUMANCONDmON II (Doubleday& Co. edition) (1958). 
2. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Efficts 
on Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL Dllv1ENSIONS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY R!GIITS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107-45 (Mitchell B. 
Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of 
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. I, 10-12 & nn.30-31 (1992) [hereinafter Merges, 
Uncertainty]; Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, I. EcoN. PERSP. 29 (1991); Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics 
as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. EcoN. LIT. 1661, 1673-74 (1990); Richard C. 
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 
BROOKifiGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 816 (1987) (citing lead time, "learning 
advantage, and sales and service effort" in addition to patents and commercial forces 
driving technology); Ariel Palces & Zvi Griliches, Patents and R & D at the Firm Level: 
. A First Look, in R&D PATENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 55-72 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984). 
3. I do not mean to suggest that technological discourse is dependent on a linguistic 
knowledge of patent law. To fully appreciate the interplay between patent law and a 
particular technological discipline, one should have fluency in both. 
4. In this Article, I use "technological practice" to mean not only the language and 
scientific· principles underlying and pertaining to the relevant technology, but also the 
economic and business factors as:;;()ciated with research and development strategies. 
5. The term "courts" includes both judges and juries. 
6. Throughout this Article, it is important to keep in mind that when I refer to the 
PTO, I am not necessarilyr~femng to.the.PTO in its present form. I am aware of the· 
systemic problems and institutional distortions, or at least the perception of such, within the 
PTO. Internal improvem!'ntand lll,odifications are crucial. For example, under my proposal 
the PTO would have to acquire a ~r sense of business acumen so as to fully appreciate 
the economic and business factors behind research and development strategy. I envision a 
PTO comprising various technological centers, individual examiners, and adjudicative 
committees trained both legally and in a particular technology, including a sense of how 
research and development decisions are made from both the business and economic 
standpoint. Three things suggest tlu1-t a<firm foundation is in place:. the structural 
relationship between the PTO and Article ill courts; their relative expertise; and the 
potential, indeed the obligation, of the PTO to enhance tl).eir technical and legal skills. See 
infra Part ill.B .3. · ' 
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would best serve the constitutional goal of promoting the progress ofthe 
useful arts? 
In attempting to answer this question, this Article applies the 
theoretical framework developed by Philip Bobbitt7 and Dennis 
Patterson.8 The thrust of this theory is the assertion that law is a 
social/linguistic practice wherein meaning is ascertained through use. 
Legal language does not obey the axioms of philosophical realism: it is 
not a representational medium that depicts how things are in the world; 
nor does a legal statement's meaning depend on lmowing the conditions 
that make it tnie.9 Rather, the truth of a legal proposition is achieved by 
working within the law. 
This approach can best be illustrated by looking to Bobbitt's 
"modal" approach to constitutional interpretation. Bobbitt identifies 
several forms of argument or "modalities" that comprise the practice of 
constitutional interpretation. According to Bobbitt, statements of 
constitutional law are true or legitimate only if the modalities are 
employed. 10 These modalities are: 
" Textual: looking to the meaning of the words of 
the Constitution alone, as they would-be 
interpreted by the average contemporary 
"man on the street"; 
" Doctrinal: applying the rules generated by precedent; 
• Historical: relying on the intentions of the framers 
and ratifiers of the Constitution; and 
• Prudential: seeking to balance the costs and benefits 
of a particular rule. 11 
7. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUITONAL FATE (1982) [hereinafter BOBBm, FATE]; 
PHILIP BOBBill, CONSTITUITONAL INTERPRETATION ( 1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, 
INTERPRETATION]. 
8. See DENNIS M. PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, 
LAW AND TRUTH]. 
9. A recent review of Patterson's Law and Troth describes realism: 
Realists believe that knowing the meaning of a proposition consists 
in knowing what facts in the world would make it true. For example, 
the statement "Dinosaurs became extinct because of climatic changes 
caused by a meteor striking the Earth," is true if and only if events in 
the distant past correspond with what the statement asserts. We may 
not lcb.ow whether the statement is true, but that does not alter the fact 
that it is (or is not) true. 
Michael C. Dor( Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 133, 
144-45 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
10. See BOBBITr, FATE, supra note 7, at 5. 
11. See BOBBm, FATE, supra note 7, at 7-8. Bobbitt provides several examples of 
how the modalities are applied. Of particular interest is their application to the nomination 
of Judge Robert H. Bork. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 7 at 83-l 08. 
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Therefore; the truth of a legal assertion like "regulation X is 
unconstitutional" is proven not by recourse to events external to the law; 
rather, the truth is shown by working within the law (i.e., applying the 
niodaliti~s). 12 · 
,As Dennis Patterson writes: 
The most important aspect of the modalities is that it is 
only through their use that the truth or falsehood of 
legal claim$ is shown. Unlike the conventional per-
spective, which sees truth of law as a function of 
something lying outside the law (for example, politics, 
moral. philosophy, etc.) the mrique, and, if correct, 
compelling aspect ofBobbitfs account or our constitu-
tional practice is that nothing is hidden. There is 
nothing woreto constitutional law (or any other body 
or doctrine) than the use of the . . . modalities of 
argument. 13 
One of the virtues ofBobbitt's modalities is that they are open-ended 
and applicable to any area of the law, including patent law. Of signifi-
cance to this Article's purpose is that application of this modal analysis 
to patent law reveals an. additional modality unique to patent law, and, 
more importantly, sheds light on the question of who should be primarily 
responsible for malcingpatent validity detenninations. 14 
Indeed, patent law and technological development are best under-
stood as linguistic practices, 15 in that patent practice requires an 
understanding of each technology's dominant discourse, and vice versa. 
The process of understanding these linguistic practices is not an 
interpretive endeavor; rather, these practices can be viewed as social in 
nature with an emphasis dn the way language is used in the social setting. 
As such, knowledge and meaning of patent law and technology are 
12. BOBB_ITI,_fAm supr.anote 7, at 34, 151. 
13. PATTERSON, LAW AND ~UTH, supra .n-ote 8, at 137. 
14. Thus my .(oyus il! not so m11ch on the utility of the. modalities in patent Ia w, for that 
much I assume .. My yon~m is with who should be charged with employing the modalities, 
and it is this inquiry .that shed~ light on who should be primarily responsible for making 
patent validity determinations. 
15. Pat'"tersonhas argued in this vein in the context of commercial law. See Dennis M. 
Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Peiformance and 
Enforcement Under ArticleNine, 137 U. PAL REY- 335, 425-29 (l988) [hereinafter 
Pa~rson, Wittgenstein and the Code]; Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as 
Practice & Narrative, 76.VA LREV. 937,991-95 (1990) [hereinafter Patterson, Law's 
Pragmatism]. 
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acquired linguistically by discerning the way in which their respective 
languages are used (e.g., claim language.and technical language used in 
research. and development schemes). This, in tum, is accomplished 
through the application of not only-the above mentioned "modalities," 
but an additional modality: the techno,-patent dynamic, which reflects 
a certain interplay between each industries', tec.hnological practice and 
the patent code. 16 These modalities, as form!:; of argument, are the 
grammar of patent law and technologic.al development. They allow us 
to understand that patent law and technological development are not 
theories; rather, -they are inextricably linked practices, "and the modali-
ties are the tools of the trade," 17 whose application maintains legitimacy 
in a legal regime. 18 AB per Bobbitt and Patterson, legitimacy means that 
the application of the modalities determines the truth or falsity of a legal 
assertion19 such as "Company X's biotechnology patent is invalid." 
Indeed, in a validity determination, claim language should not be viewed 
in isolation; rather, the_ entity charged with this determination should 
broaden its focus to include the relevant industry language and practice 
to which the claim language pertains. 
Based on the assumption that the legitimacy of a legal regime is 
maintained by employment of the modalities/0 the fimdamental question 
this Article addresses is who is best suited to comprehend and employ 
these modalities in the context of validity determinations? In other 
words, who should be the grammarian charged with maintaining 
legitimacy with respect to issues of patent validity: the courts or the 
PTO? 
My focus is on who best employs the modalities in patent law given 
that the property rights conferred by a patent are determined by the scope 
16. See infra Part II.A. 
17. Dennis M. Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 270, 
294 ( 1993) [hereinafter Patterson, Conscience]. 
18. Patterson states: 
Legitimacy is not something a system oflaw can achieve writ large. 
The legitimacy of a legal system is an accretion; it develops over time 
and is maintained onry by adherence to the legal forms of argument. 
To the extent that these modalities are compromised or ignored, 
particular decisions are illegitimate, and, over time, the legitimacy of 
the system as a whole is undermined. 
PATIERSON, LAW AND TRUTH, supra note 8, at 138. I would also submitthat the entity 
charged with employing the modalities is an important factor in maintaining legitimacy. 
19. See id at 70 (referring to modalities, Patterson states that "[it] is in their use that 
propositions oflaw are characterized as true or false."). 
20. Indeed, the reasons why one should employ the modalities has been persuasively 
and eloquently expressed by Philip Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson. See generally BoBBm, 
FATE, supra note 7; BOBBm, lNTERPRETATION, supra note 7; PATTERSON, LAW AND 
TRUTH, supra note 8. 
,, 
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or, metes and bounds, of one's invention as defined by a patent's claim 
language. 21 The anticipated breadthof one's patent claims is crucial to 
one's present and future incentive to innovate. It follows, therefore, that 
the entity charged with ascertaining the meaning and validity of patent 
claims lies at the heart of a modem patent system . 
. None of the pending patent 1egislation22 addresses what I perceive 
to be a significant shortcoming of our current patent system: patent 
validity determinations inherent in our enforcement procedure. 23 Indeed, 
one must view somewhat suspiciously a patent system that requires 
federal district judges and lay juries to: (1) comprehend and ascertain 
the meaning of sophisticated technological art; (2) construe arcane patent 
claim language24 in light of its characteristically lengthy and convoluted 
written record; and, in the end, (3) inform us as to whether the PTO 
21. The claim is that "part of the patent that defines the technology which is the 
exclusive property of the patentee. A patent claim sets the bounds of the technical area 
within which the patent owner has the legal right to exclude others from making, using, and 
selling." J. THOMAS McCARTHY, DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTEllECTUAL PROPERTY 51 
(2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter McCARTHY, DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Motion Picture Patents Co. 
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. argues: 
The scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the 
claims contained in it . . . . These so mark where the progress 
claimed by the patent begins and where it ends that they have been 
aptly likened to the description in a deed, which sets the bounds to the 
grant which it contains. It is to the claims of every patent, therefore, 
that we must turn when we are seeking to determine what the 
invention is, ... ' [the patentee] can claim nothing beyond them.' 
243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917) (citations omitted). See also Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("It is the claims which define the metes 
and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system."). 
22. See, e.g., H.R 400, 105ili Cong. (1997) (21st Century Patent System Improvement 
Act of 1997: to modernize tlle PTO management, improve patent procedures, add 
protection for prior domestic users of patented technology, enhance protection of individual 
rights, and improve reexamination procedures); S. 507, 105th Cong. (1997) (Omnibus 
Patent Act of 1997: to establish ilie PTO as a privatized government agency and amend 
patent procedures relating to patent application, commercial use of patents, and patent 
reexan1ination). 
23. By patent enforcement procedure, I mean the legal procedure by which patents are 
enforced and challenged in our federal court system, specifically the federal district courts. 
24. Aliliough ilie Supreme Court has held in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996), iliat claim construction is solely within ilie province ofilie 
court, ilie issue of infringement still requires the jury to decide whether the accused device 
infringes the claims of the patent in suit. Therefore, juries must comprehend the accused 
device and the technical language associated therewith. As Federal Circuit Judge Bryson 
stated, "because ofilie increasing popularity of jury trials in patent infringement cases, ilie 
issue of infringement by equivalents is often given to a jury iliat is unfaniili.ar with tlle 
principles of patent law, unschooled iri. the pertinent technology, and accorded only modest 
direction ilirough general, pattern instructions." Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 
F.3d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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properly applied the patentability provisions ofTitle 35 that it encounters 
on a daily basis. 
This deficiency of the present enforcement mechanism is exacer-
. bated when. it :is viewed in light of the significant constitutional dimen-
sionunderlyillg our pa:tentlaws; Indeed; Article I, Sectioli 8, Clause 8 of 
the Constitution provides the benchmark . by which our patent system 
must be. evaluated and judged. This constitutional provision :empowers 
Congress to "promote the Progress of ... [the] useful Arts."25 In light of 
such, we ask, as we must with respect to any legislation pertaining to our 
patent system: does the particular law or legal scheme in question 
promote the progress of the useful arts? My principal assertion is that 
the present enforcement procedure does not. To resolve this deficiency, 
I propose the incorporation of the PTO into the patent enforcement 
procedure beyond the present reissue and reexamination mechanisms. 26 
The PTO should be the grammarian27 charged with employing the 
modalities as a means of ascertaining the meaning arid validity of patent 
claims.28 Arguably, judges and juries do not have the requisite lrn.owl-
edge or information about the language of each technology and how that 
language relates to the patent code, nor the costs and benefits of research 
and development for each industry. Although the PTO is an imperfect 
agency, it is institutionally better positioned and better able to understand 
these considerations. 29 
I propose that when a patent is litigated, the federal district court, 
after the close of discovery, should transfer the validity determination to 
the PTO and subsequently review the validity determination under the 
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, states: "[TheCongress shall have the power to] 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." For a 
discussion on this clause, see generally Kenneth J. Burchfield, Revisiting the "Original" 
Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 
(1989); EdwardS. Irons & Mary Helen Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention-
The Touchstone of Patent Reform, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 653; Giles S. Rich, Principles of 
Patentability, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 393, 394-97 (1960); Karl L. Lu1z, Patents and 
Sdence: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the Constitution, 18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
50 (1949). 
26. See. Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposed Changes to Japanese and United States 
Patent Law Enforcement, 3 PAC. RIML. & PoL'Y J. 389, 391 (1995) (arguing for a greater 
enforcement role for the respective patent offices of Japan and the United States). 
27. See supra note 6. 
28. Ideally, the United States should adopt an opposition-type proceeding during the 
patent prosecution stage, for such a proceeding would be inter partes in nature and result 
in a greater degree.ofconfidence in one's property interest. 
29. Although the present patent code does not explicitly require the PTO or judge to 
examine research and development, and innovation policy when passing on patent validity, 
I believe that a consideration of such is important. See infra note 94. 
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arbitrary and capnc10us standard or the framework established m 
Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defrnse Council_3° 
In justifYing my argument, I am informed by the philosophy of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein}1 For,Wittgenstein, meaning and use go hand·in 
hand. · Wittgenstein asserted that "the speaking of a language· is part of 
an activity.''32 As Patterson put it, "[t]o understand hum:a.tnictivities, ... 
one must understand how the participants in the activity conduct it."33 
Of particular relevance to my proposition is that throughout the past 15 0 
years there has evolved a certain techno-patent dynamic, my fifth 
modality,· and the PTO has been key throughout this evolution. 
Therefore, I take the position thatthe PTO is the best available grammar-
ian. It is suited to work with the grammar of patent law and technologi-
30. 467 U.S. 83 7 ( 1984 ). In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that: 
If ... the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of 
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with· respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
Id at 843 (footnotes omitted). See also Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the 
Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415 (1995) (arguing for Chevron deference to PTO 
patentability determinations). 
31. I am primarily informed by Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, published 
posthumously in 1953. Philosophical Investigations attempts to modify our perspective on 
how we view language, and is generally regarded as a repudiation of his 1923 work, the 
Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, in which he argued that language is representative of 
reality. According to Patterson: · 
[I]n his "first phase," Wittgenstein argued that language mirrored 
reality. Thus, the study oflanguage could be a way of uncovering the 
logical structure of the world. In his "second phase," . . . 
Wittgenstein took up a whole new approach to philosophy. 'In this 
phase of his thought Wittgenstein concerned himself with the 
question of how language acts as a constitutive medium of under-
standing. Put succinctly, in his first phase(Wittgenstein believed that 
language pictured 'the world. In his second phase, Wittgenstein 
believed that language gave us a world. 
Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Practice, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 575, 576 n.9 (1990). See also 
Thomas D. Eisele, "Our Real Need~': Not Explanation, But Education; in WmGENSTEIN 
AND LEGAL THEoRY30 (Dennis M. Patterson ed. 1992) ("Wittgeristein's later philosophy 
is essentially concerned with understanding what we are doing when we act, speak, and 
think."). 
32. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INvESTIGATIONS § 23 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) (throughout this Article, punctuation as in original) 
[hereinafter WmGENSTEIN, ·INvEsTIGATIONS]. 
33. Den:nis M, Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional TheoJ_ry.;_u."-'--I>A--L...-AQ 
1837, 1844 (1994). 
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cal development. It is strategically positioned34 to linguistically delve 
into the relevant patent and technological cultures, and ascribe meaning 
to the languages employed within these cultures. 35 
This ArtiCle is divided into two parts. In Part II, I discuss the later 
philosophy' of Ludwig·Wittgenstein.and·itS .relevance. to patent .law, 
specifically claim interpretation and validity. In Part III, I explore the 
application of Wittgenstein' s philosophy in the context. of claim 
interpretation and validity and seek to show how the PTO should be 
given a great deal more deference in the patent enforcement mechanism 
as it pertains to validity determinations. 
II. LEGITIMACY AND PATENT ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE: 
WORKING FROM WITHIN 
[Tjhe meaning of a word is its use in the language. 36 
A. Wittgenstein arid the Law 
Before we explore how Wittgenstein informs our m1derstanding of 
the law, it would be helpful briefly to discuss his approach to 
philosophy. 37 Although the notion that there are two Wittgensteins is a 
34. Wittgenstein refers to this perspective as "perspicuous representation": 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not com-
mand a clear View of ourwords. Oucgrammar is lacking in this sort 
of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation· produces just that 
understanding which consists.in··'seeiitg connexions'. Hence the 
importance of finding and .inventing intermediate cases. 
The concept of a perspicuous :~epresentation is of fundamental 
significance for us. It earmarks the form ofa~count we give, the way 
we look at things. (Is.this a 'Weltanschauung'?) 
WmGENSTEw, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 122. 
35. Wittgenstein states: 
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must 
take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its 
purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not 
empirical problems: they are.solved, rather.by looking into the 
workings .ofour language, and that in suc;h_a way as to make us 
recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand 
them. 
Id § 109. This non-positivistic appro<!-ch .allows the PTO to assume the role of a linguistic 
archeologist armed with modal tools' in search of meaning based on use. As Dennis 
Patterson states, '"reality' does not come prepackaged." PATTERSON, LAW AND TRurn, 
supra note 8; at 169 . 
. 36. WmGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 43. 
3 7. Wittgenstein also wrote in the fields ofpsychology and mathematics. See LUDWIG 
WmGENSTEIN, REMARKs. ON THE PHILosOPHY OF PsYCHOLOGY (G£.M, Anscombe & 
right .E.M. Anscombe trans., 1980); and LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
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subject of debate,38 much of Wittgenstein's work throughout his career 
was devoted to the understanding and use of language. 39 
Wittgenstein's post-Tractarian philosophy40 - after 1929 -
eschewed the demand for Platonic certainty and a unified theory of 
language, and posited thatlanguage is best i.rilderstood as a labyrinth of 
interconnected practices.41 That is; the diversity and plurality of 
language make it impossible to discern a universall:iilguistic algorithm. 
For Wittgenstein, the "philosophical concept of meaning has its place in 
a primitive idea of the way language functions. "42 In contrast, "the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language. "43 This notion is nicely 
illustrated by Wittgenstein' s "five red apples" example found in his 
Philosophical Investigations: 
I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked 
"five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, 
who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks 
up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample 
opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers 
- I assume that he knows them by heart - up to the 
REMARKs ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS (G.H. von Wright et al. eds., G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 1956). 
38. See G. HALLETT, WmGENSTEIN'S DEFINTTION OF MEANING As USE 3 (1967) 
("There is some disagreement as to whether there were two Wittgensteins or one."); 
Patterson, Law's Practice, supra note 31, at 57 6 n.9 ("The question whether there is one 
Wittgenstein or two is endlessly debated."). 
39. See HALLETT, MEANING As USE, supra note 38, at 3-4 ("[Wittgenstein's] work 
falls clearly into two periods. The first period began late in 1911 or early in 1912, when 
Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge to study logic and the foundations of mathematics under 
Russell .... [Wittgenstein's second period began·when he] returned to Cambridge and to 
philosophy in 1929."). 
40. See WmGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 43. 
41. See generally ROBERT J. ACKERMAN, WmGENSTEIN'S CITY 4 7-66 ( 1988 ). 
42. WmGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 2. 
43. I d. § 43. Professors Baker and Hacker explain this "contextualism" as follows: 
A sentence is akin to a move in chess, and a move is only a move in 
the- context of a game. So even a sentence has no meaning in 
isolation. Understanding a language is the background against which 
a sentence acquires meaning, as understanding chess is for a move. 
A sentence is a position in the 'game oflanguage,' hence to under-
. stand a sentence is to understand a language: Thus interpreted, the 
contextual dictum is directly connected with· use. It is connected with 
structure only in so far as structure reflects use. 
G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WIDGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING 280 
(1980); see also M. 0AKESHOTT, Political Education, in RATIONALISM IN POLfTICS AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 111, 129 (1962) ("We do not begin to learn our native language by learning 
the alphabet, or by learning itS granrmar; we do not begin by learning words, but words in 
use.") (emphasis added). 
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word "five" and for each number he takes an apple of 
the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. - It 
is in this and similar ways that one operates with 
words.-. . "But.how does he lmow where and how is 
he to lookup the word 'red' and what he is to do with . 
the word 'five'?"- Well; I assume that he acts as.J 
. have described. Explanations comes . to· an end some-
where . -.But what is the meaning of the word "five"? · 
- No such thing was in question here, only how the 
word "five" is used. 44 
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This example conveys Wittgenstein's belief that "the teaching of 
language is not explanation, but training. "45 The meaning of a word is 
discerned by demonstrating how it is used, that is, by observing the 
activities in which the shopkeeper is engaged. 46 In essence, Wittgenstein 
views these activities as the grammar of ideas, a grammar possessing 
certain conventions. He refers to this dynamic as a "language-game,"47 
44. WmGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § l. 
45. Id § 5. See also BAKER. & HACKER, supra note 43, at 71 ("Language must speak 
for itself. Consequently, grammatical explanations presuppose a background of prior 
understanding, a partial linguistic competence. With language-learners such as we, 
explanation has a pedagogical role only after brute training has laid the foundations of 
elementary linguistic skills."). 
46. See BAKER & HACKER, supra note 43, at 63: 
Each of the three words in 'five red apples' has a different use, an.:! 
this can be described without answering questions such as 'What is 
the meaning of the word "five"?'- where 'meaning' is thought to 
be given by specification of an entity. Of course, [Wittgensteia' s] 
point is that there is nothing left to say about the meaning of 'five' 
(properly understood) after its use has been described. The meaning · 
of a word is given by specification of its use, and this can Je done 
without answering questions such as 'Of what is "five" the name?' 
or 'What does "five" stand for?' 
47. WrrrGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 7. Wittgenstein states, ''I shall 
also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 
'language-game'." Id By using the term "language-game," Wittgenstein seems to be 
suggesting that meaning is discerned from examining the interrelationship between language 
and its contextual setting. Theodore Scha1zki notes: 
A language-game consists both of the use of a particular element of 
language (word, expression, sentence, etc.) and of features of the 
activities in which instances of that use are embedded .... [f]he use 
of language is one element among many in our activities, which 
themselves are embedded in a matrix of interrelated actual and 
possible activities, the totality of which constitutes the form of life in 
which the user of language finds himself. 
Theodore Scha1zki, The Prescription is Description: Wittgenstein 's View of the Human 
Sciences, in THE NEED FoR INTERPRETATION: CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF THE 
PHILOSOPHER's TASK 118, 126 (S. Mitchell & M. Rosen eds., 1983), quoted in Patterson, 
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whereby "the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of 
life."48 To understand an idea, one must examine the activities that are 
part of the idea.49 Observing the application of words in action (i.e., 
activities), and not their origin, leads to understanding. 50 As Professor 
Dennis Patterson ex:pla.i.D:s~ifor Wittgenstein, "[a]ll understanding begins 
in langu£tge; but to understand· the ·grammar of a concept one needs to 
investigate the point(s) the concept serves in social practices (the 
activities into which it is woven), which practices must themselves be the 
focus of attention in any investigation of meaning. "51 
Wittgenstein' s approach to language is not concerned with subject 
and object, 52 for there is no mediating device between the activity and 
Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 15, at 361 n.84. See also H.L. FINcH, 
WmGENSTElN 44-45 ( 199 5) 
48. WmGENSTElN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 23. 
49. Baker aqdHacker state that two of.the mostiinportant features ofWittgenstein's 
language-games are "context" and "activity of the game." With respect to the former, Baker 
and Hacker write: 
Like any other game, a language-game is 'played' in a setting. 
Wittgenstein's stress on the context of the game appears to be 
motivated by the wish to bring to the fore elements of linguistic 
activities which, while not obviously involved in the explanation of 
the meaning of constituent expressions[,] . . . are nevertheless 
pertinent to their meaning. At its most general the notion of context 
encompasses the presuppositions of meaning. If the context were 
significantly different, the game would not be played, for it would be 
pointless. 
BACKER & HAcKER, supra note 43, at 96-97 (citation omitted). And the "activity of the 
game" is related to "context," in that: 
Id at 97. 
It is in the activities constitutive of a language-game that the point 
and purpose of linguistic expressions is evident. Concentration upon 
the activity which is the 'playing' of a language-game highlights the 
diversity oflinguistic symbols, emphasizes their normal contexts of 
use, their normal (diverse) purposes, and the normal justifications for 
their use. 
50. For Wittgenstein, study of the language-game "disperses the fog" so that one can 
"study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can 
command· a clear view of the aim and fUnctioning of the words." WmGENSTEIN, 
INvEsTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 5. 
51. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code, supra note 15, at 363. See also FINcH, supra 
note47, at44 ("Grammatical remarks ... are binding norms oflanguage[:] conventional, 
historical, and changing . . . . In them ... we see the meanings of a culture."). 
52. Finch notes with respect to Wrttgenstein's later philosophy: 
[W]e should notice one fact of central importance, that the unit of 
meaning here already involves in o'ne complex the three factors of 
human beings, a world-setting and ianguage, So far as I know, this 
is the first time in Western thought when the starting point for 
thought was not, in however disguised a way, a subject and object, 
which a philosopher then attempted to relate to each other. 
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those engaged in the activity. 53 Take the example of a basketball coach 
who wants one of his players to "pass the ball" to a teammate. Assume 
that the coach simply says "pass the ball." What is meant by "pass the 
ball''? If the player does not learn through training (i.e., p:racticing 
basketball with his coach) thatto "pass the ball'' means to give.the ball 
to a teammate, the player may shoot the ball or throw the ball to a player 
on the opposing team. In another culture, "pass the ball" may very well 
mean deliver the ball to your oppo11.ent, or simply do nothing with it· at 
all. The point is that we learn the meaning of "pass the ball" through 
training; 54 as Wittgenstein noted, '"obeying a rule' is a practice. "55 
B. The Grammarian as Gatekeeper 
Central to the thesis I advance is that of the grammarian. Under 
Wittgenstein's analysis, the grammarian does more than simply affix 
FINcH, supra note 47, at 44. 
53. This notion is in direct contravention to the views of Ronald Dworkin and Stanley 
Fish, both of whom assert that to properly understand language, there must . be an 
interpreting interloper between the activity and participant. Dworkin's understanding of the 
law is a matter of "constructive interpretation." See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKJN, LAW's 
EMPIRE 52-3 (1986). Fish, however, focuses on the relevant community consensus. See, 
e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 141 (1989). For Dworkin, 
"[a]ccording to law as integrity, propositions oflaw are true if they figure in or follow from 
the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best 
constructive interpretation of the community's legal practice." DWORKJN, LAW's EMPIRE 
225. Thus Dworkin believes that "propositions of law are made true because they stand in 
a certain relationship to political theory." Dennis M. Patterson, Conscience and the 
Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 270, 279 ( 1993). As for Fish, the meaning of a text is 
derived from the reader who is part of an interpretive community. For a proposition of law 
to be true for Fish, the interpretive community must come to some form of interpretive 
agreement. See FisH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 141. Thus, both Dworkin and Fish 
transcend the boundaries oflegal practice in their search for the law's proper meaning. For 
an excellent discussion of the debate between Dworkin and Fish, see PATTERSON, LAW & 
TRUTII, supra note 8, at 71-98. 
54. See BAKER & HACKER., supra note 43, at 93 ("The foundation of the ability to play 
a game lies in training; the ability to play it is mastery of a technique. Playing games is a 
human activity, and its existence presupposes common reactions, propensities, and 
abilities."). What is important to understand is that "different training ... would have 
· effected a quite different understanding." See WmGENSTEIN, INvEsTIGATIONS, supra note 
32, § 6. 
55. WmGENSTEIN; INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 202. As Baker & Hacker note: 
In many of his invented language-games Wittgenstein sketches the 
different kinds of training necessary for a participant to be able to 
play (e.g., memorizing words, memorizing the sequence of natural 
numbers, ... etc.). This highlights the nature of rule-following, and 
the way in which the "gap" between rules and their application is 
bridged. 
BAKER & HACKER, supra note 43, at 97. 
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labels to objects, for she is a linguistic mechanic using the tools of 
language in a contextual fashion. The ascription of meaning to a word is 
not accomplished through "ostensive definition,"56 that is, merely 
pointing to an object and saying, "this is called 'x'." An ostensive 
definition of a word fails· to inform how that word will be employed in 
future discourse57 and only works if the grammarian has. a "previously 
'established linguistic friunework."58 As Wittgenstein writes, "(o]ne has 
already to lmow (or be able to do) somet4ing in order to be capable of 
asking a thing's name."59 Yet, 
[w]hat does it mean to say that we cannot define (that 
is, describe) these elements, but .only name them? ... 
For naming and describing do not stand on the same 
level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming 
is so far not a move in the language-game, any more 
than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move 
in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been done, 
when a thing has been named. It has not even got a 
name except in the language-game.60 
For Wittgenstein, ostensive definition only works in the context of an 
activity. This would be the case when a "child [comes] into a strange 
country and [does J not understand the language of the country; that is, as 
56. See WITTGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 28; see also FOGELIN, 
WITTGENSTEIN 115 (1992). 
57. As Wittgenstein writes on the concept of ostensive definition: 
'We name things and then we talk about them: can refer to them in 
talk.' As if what we did next were given with the mere act of 
naming. As if there were only one thing called 'talking about a 
thing.' Whereas in fact ·we do the most various things with our 
sentences. 
WITIGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 27. Baker and Hacker remark that 
"[t]he Augustinian conception takes for granted the general structure of language and how 
it is used, finds thatthis m:eds supplementation by ostensive definition or teaching of 
names, and wrongly jumps to the conclusion that everything about language follows from 
the correlation of names and objects." BAKER & HACKER, supra note 43, at 87. See also 
FoGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 56, at 117 ("[A] person does not understand the 
meaning of a term unless he can use it correctly in regular discourse, that is, beyond the 
ostensive definition game."). 
58. FOGELIN, supra note 56, at 118. 
59. WITIGENSTEIN, INvEsTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 30. 
60. Id § 49. This is not to. suggest thatWrttgensteinbelieves that explanations via 
ostensive definition.are defective as compared to other forms of explanation. Rather, he 
seeks to demonstrate that ostensive definitions "do not lay the foundations oflanguage." 
See BAKER. & HACKER,. supra note 43, at 171-72. 
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if it already [has] a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child 
[can] already think, only not yet speak."61 
A PTO comprised of technological centers and individual examiners 
trained in each technology would be cognizant of, and· informed by, 
present technological realities as reflected in the patent code in order to 
understand the meaning of language in patent law. Technology is 
perpetually transient; "new'' inventions, building upon prior know-
ledge, 62 are always coming to the fore, and what the claim language of 
these inventions mean and whether or not the invention described by 
claim language is valid (nonobvious) are inquiries that have their focus 
in the past and present. 63 Because the patent applicant can be her own 
lexicographer, 64 patent claim language, and the language of technology 
to which it is bound, are polysemous and in constant need of defining. 65 
Indeed, these languages create their own realities with impudent 
sovereignty. As the court in Autogiro Co. of America v. United States 
stated, "[o]ften the invention is novel and words do nof exist to describe 
it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It 
cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for 
things."66 
All that exist are names and labels (e.g., "obvious" and "RAM"). 
We turn yet again to Wittgenstein: 
One thinks that learning language consists in giving 
names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to 
colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc. . To 
repeat - naming is something like attaching a label to 
a thing. One can say that this is prepatory to the use of 
a word. But what is it a preparation for? 
"We name things and then we can talk about them: 
can refer to them in talk." - As if what we did next 
were given with the mere act of naming. As if there 
6l. WmGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 32. 
62. See Scotchmer, supra note 2, at l ("Most innovators stand on the shoulders of 
giants, and never more so than in the current evolution of high technologies, where almost 
all technical progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators."). 
63. Indeed, it has been said that "inventions are the result of social accretions to prior 
inventions." JOSEPH ROSSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY OF :rHE INvENTOR 3 ( 1931 ). 
64. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("It 
is the inventor applying for a patent who ·is permitted to be his own lexicographer."); see 
also Fromsonv. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
65. As Heraclitus stated years ago, "[y ]ou could not step twice into the same river, for 
other waters are ever flowing on to you." AsHTON APPLEWHITE ET AL., AND I QUOTE 466 
(l992). 
66. 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
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were only one thing called "talking about a thing". 
Whereas in fact we do the most various things with our 
sentences. Think of exclamations alone, with their 







Are you inclined still to call these words "names of 
objects"?67 
[Vol. 10· 
One of Wittgenstein's primary themes is that "linguistic behavior 
reveals a motley of activities that can hardly be captured under the 
paradigms of naming and describing,"68 for "an ostensive definition can 
be variously interpreted in every case."69 Indeed, this is particularly 
applicable to patent law where, much like Lewis Carroll's Alice in 
Wonderland in which something means whatever one wants it to mean, 
the patent applicant can be her own lexicographer. 70 The implication of 
such is that a unitary theory of patent and technical language cannot 
exist.71 
67. WmGENSTEIN, INvEsTIGATIONS, supra note 32, §§ 26-7. 
68. FOGELIN, supra note 56, at Ill. As Baker & Hacker write: 
The possibility of referring to things does not flow, as it were, from 
the mere act of naming. We do refer to, and talk about, things; but 
this is merely one of a multitude of speech activities which must be 
learnt Naming is neither a preparation for this alone, nor is learning 
a name sufficient for being able to talk about something. 
BAKER & HACKER, supra note 43, at 161. See also WmGENSTEIN, INvEsTIGATIONS, 
supra note 32, § II ("Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a 
screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. -The functions of words are as 
diverse as the. functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)"). 
69. WmGENSTEIN, INvEsTIGATIONS; supra note 32, § 28. 
70. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. AeroquipCorp., 733F.2d 881, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
71. Norman Malcolm describes Wittgenstein's reasoning thus: 
[After 1929] Wittgenstein came.to.the realization that "what we call 
'proposition' and 'language' is not the formal unity that 
[Wittgenstein] had imagined but is a family of structures more or less 
related to one another." The implication of this perception was that 
there coilldnot be a correct philosophic!ll theory of language. If the 
concept of language. is not a unitary concept, we should expect the 
same of the other concepts with which philosophy has struggled. If 
the word "cause", as it is actually used, does not have .a' uniform · 
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With that in mind, instead of "exclamations," let us substitute a 







employment, but an irregular one, then there cannot be a correct 
theory of the essence of causation .... The same holds for the 
concepts of truth, representation, knowledge, justice, the good and 
so on. Wittgenstein's new insight into the actual wo~king of language 
implies that the enterprise of philosophical analysis, as traditionally 
conceived, is based dn a false assumption. 
NORMAN MALCOLM, WITTGENSTEIN: A R.EUGIOUS POINT OF Vmw? 43 ( 1993 ). The same 
could be said for patent and technical language, for example, where the statutory term 
"obvious" or "new" as applied to a claimed invention does not posses a unitary concept. 
72. See 35 U.S.C. § lO l (1994) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new or useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof; may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title."). 
73. See id 
74. See id; see also 35 U.S.C. § l02(a)-(e), (g) (1994). 
75. 35 U.S.C. § l02(a) & (b) (1994) provide: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this 
country, or patented or described in a printed publi-
cation in this or a foreign country, before the inven-
tion thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was· patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public 
use or on sale in this country, more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent in the 
United States .... 
76. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) provides: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed or describ~d as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary 
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
77. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it; in such full, 
dear, c6ncise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use. the same, and shall set forth the best mode contem-
plated by the iriveritor of ciirrying out his invention. 








Like "one-word exclamations," the range of meaning for these terms 
"is enormously varied."84 Simply to label an invention "useful" or 
"obvious" does not inform us as to what "useful" and "obvious" mean; 
nor are we aware of the meaning of "invention. "85 When the computer 
industry employs the label "RAM," what does it means by random 
access memory? What is an "ester"? There is no uniform employment 
of the statutory terms "obvious" and "useful," for these terms do not 
possess a pre-existing meaning that is interpreted; rather, the meaning of 
these words are asc~ed through their use in patent law and in the 
technology. 86 Each technology has its oWn language and relates to the 
78. The term "expression" is commonly used in the field of biotechnology to indicate 
the "[p ]roduction of an observable phenotype by a gene- usually by the synthesis of a 
protein." BRUCE AlBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL G-9 (3d ed. 1994 ). 
79. The term "vector" is commonly used in the field of biotechnology to indicate "an 
agent (virus or plasmid) used to transmit genetic material to a cell or organism." I d at G-
23. 
80. The acronym "RAM'' stands for "random access memory." 
81. The acronym ''ROM'' stands for "read only memory." 
82. An amide is an organic compound containing the group -CONH2 (the carbamoyl 
group). Amides are volatile solids that are formed by the reaction of ammonia with 
electropositive metals. See A DICTIONARY OF CHEMisTRY 28 (John Daintith ed., 3d ed. 
1996). 
83. An ester is an organic compound formed by a reaction between an alcohol and an 
acid. Esters have a variety of applications, including use in fragrances. See id at 192. 
84. See BAKER & HACKER, supra note 43, at 161. 
85. See ROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 8 (''The term invention is one of the most elusive 
words in the English language."). 
86. Justice John Marshall, in attempting to discern the meaning of the word 
"necessary," stated: 
If reference be had to its use,' in the common affairs of the world, or 
in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than 
that one thing is convenient, or usefuL or essential to another .... 
Such is the chanicter of human language, that no one word conveys 
to the mii:u:J, in alL situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is 
more colilmon than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all 
compositionS contain words, which, .taken in their rigorous sense, 
would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously 
intended. Itis essential to just construction, that many words which 
import somethiiJ.g excessive, should be understood in a more 
mitigated sense - in that sense which common usage justifies. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,413-14 (4 Wheat.18l9). 
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patent law differently. Take a recent issue in the field of biotechnology: 
whether a DNA sequence is obvious in light of a prior art protein for 
which it codes. The Federal Circuit has held that the DNA sequence is 
not obvious.87 However, this deten:Wnation turns on whether the court 
views the issue interms,ofstructm~ chemistry or biology.Jf1:h,e former 
prevails, the sequence is nonobvious, according to the court; but, given 
the current· state of biotechnology, the PTO's position we~;s that the 
relevant technology for obviousness purposes is biology, and thus the 
sequence is obvious.88 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 103 of the patent code, or when an 
inventor claims a DNA sequence, these mere acts alone do not give 
meaning to the· statutory and claim language, respectively. Rather, it is 
the practice of reading statutes and claim language in the context of the 
relevant technology that provide us with meaning: 
With the above in mind, Wittgenstein' s approach to language 
informs us as to how words in a legal text are meaningful. By working 
within the text itself and participating in the activities associated 
therewith, one does not so much interpret the words in the text through 
a mediating lens as discern their meaning from engaging and focusing on 
the practices in which these words are used. For example, in the context 
of patent law, how do we know when an invention is "obvious" or 
"enabling''? What.do we mean by the words "obvious" and "enable"? 
What does "expression" mean in the field of recombinant DNA? What 
are "disassembly gates" in the technological realm of computers and 
electronics? A Wittgenstein devotee would assert that "the teaching of 
language is . . . training, "89 and "the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language"; 90 this implies that for claim interpretation and validity 
determination the claim language should be read in the light of the 
relevant industry practice as this practice and the patentability provisions 
(e.g., § 103) have a certain dynamic relationship from which a patent 
claim emerges. 
This Article focuses on who has the best understanding of the 
grammar (i.e., the modalities) of patent law and the technological 
language used in patent law. Using Wittgenstein' s insight that meaning 
is to be found in use, this implies that this entity should be primarily 
responsible-for patent validity determinations and claim interpretation. 
87. See In re Bell, 991 F2d 7&l (Fed. Cir. l993);ln re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
88. This is explored more thoroughly in note 95 and accompanying text. 
89. WIITGENSTHIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 5. 
90. Id. § 43. 
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III. POSTMODERNISM AND PATENT VALIDITY 
The semantics ofthe vocabulary of patent law, should 
that subject ever be adequately studied, would show 
thatthoseWho attemptto ai~ciiss the patent system, ... 
whether as jrlenas or foes of the patent system, are 
subject to a tyranny of words. 91 · 
A. A Postmodern Framework 
1. The Modalities ofPatent Validity Determinations 
[Vol. 10 
There are five modalities that pertain to the practice of patent law. 
Four of these modalities were articulated by Philip Bobbitt in the context 
of constitutional·law. 92 
In addition, I posit a fifth modality, unique to patent law, tliat I refer 
to as the "techno-patent dynamic," and which pertains to the interplay 
between the patent code, technological language, undedying principles, 
and research and development strategies of the various technologies (i.e., 
technological practice). 93 For example: 
The · standard of patentability is assumed to have 
behavioral effects [on research and development 
('R&D") decisions] and thus merits careful review. 
Firins will say, "Look, Firm A got a patent for doing 
that risky research; let's do some risky research our-
selves." There are several reasons to believe the patent 
stari.daid has such effects. Detailed case studies show 
that almost every fum at least tries to evaluate the cost 
effectiveness of proposed research and development 
projects. R&D managers also consider "patentability" 
or "patent strength" prior to investing in R&D projects. 
Thus the prospect of getting a patent may enter into the 
initial project investment or selection choice. If so, the 
91. Giles S. Rich, The Relationship Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly 
Laws, 24 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 85, 85-86 (1942). 
92. Historical, textual, doctrinal, and prudential. See supra PART I; BoBBm, FATE, 
supra note 7. 
93. See supra note 4. Bobbitt explains that the modalities "often work in combination. 
Some. examples fit under one heading as well as another." I d. at 8. Instead of creating an 
additional modality, I could just as easily have incorporated the techno-patent dynainic 
modality within the prudential modality, as the latter is very broad. However, by isolating 
a new modality, I believe that my thesis is better served by sharpening the focus of the 
reader's attention on the dynamic relationship between the patent law and industry. 
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standard of patentability enters at this stage. Even for 
finns whose research proceeds further before making 
a detailed cost/benefit analysis, patentability might 
enter in the very rough (and sometimes implicit) 
economic . feasibility decisions made by the R&D 
department eat the outset ofthe research project. 94 . 
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Applying the modalities, particularly the techno-patent dynamic, 
requires facility in the appropriate technological and patent "lexicons." 
With respect to the former, it is readily apparent that each technology has 
its own language and relates to the patent code differently. Witness the 
topical issue that I touched upon earlier, of whether a DNA sequence is 
obvious in the light of the prior art protein (i.e., amino acid sequence) for 
which it codes. 95 The PTO, specifically the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences ("the Board"),96 has held that "once the amino acid 
94. Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 2, at 10-12. Zvi Griliches concurs: 
[I]here is quite a strong relationship between R & D and the number 
of patents received at the cross-sectional level, across firms and 
industries. The median R-Square is on the order of0.9, indicating 
that patents may indeed be a good indicator of unobserved inventive 
output. ... [T]he evidence is quite strong that when a firm changes 
its R & D expenditures, parallel changes occur also in its patent 
numbers. 
Griliches, supra note 2, at 1673-74'. See also Pakes & Griliches, supra note 2; Robert P. 
Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. 
L. REv. 839,878 (1990) (referring to the relationship between research and development 
expenditures, invention, and productivity growth, the authors state that "increases in 
research and development expenditures yield more inventions.") (footnotes omitted). 
95. Perhaps a brief background on certain DNA principles will facilitate the 
examination of this issue. Genetic information is contained in chromosomes. Chromo-
somes consist of various accessoiy proteins and two strands of deoxyribonucleic acid 
(''DNA"). The two linked strands of purine and pyrimidine bases, known as nucleotides, 
hydrogen bond with each other to form a double helix. Certain portions of the DNA encode 
for various proteins, which comprise several amino acids. That portion of the DNA which 
codes for a protein is called a gene. Within each gene there are strings of triplet nucleotides 
called codons (three nucleotides comprise a codon), which specify for each amino acid 
within a protein. The codons are translated into the regulatory and structural proteins that 
comprise various cell components. Gene expression of DNA results in the transcription of 
a messenger ribonucleic acid ("mRNA:') molecule which in tum is "translated" in a protein. 
See general~ PETER H. RAVEN & GEORGE B. JOHNSON, BIOLOGY 280-364 (3rd ed. 1992); 
ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 78; RoGER L.P. ADAMS ET AL., THE BIOCHEMISTRY OF TilE 
NUCLEIC ACIDS (11th ed. 1992). 
96. The Board is an adjudicative body within the PTO that hears: ( l) appeals from a 
patent examiner's decision refusing to issue a patent on a particular claimed invention; (2) 
questions of priority in interference proceedings between two or more inventive entities for 
the same invention; and (3) entitlement proceedings that determine whether the inventor or 
the federal government is the owner of a patent on an invention developed during work 
under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. See McCARTHY, DESK 
536 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [VoL 10 
sequence of a known useful protein is known, there is motivation for one 
of ordinary skill in the relevant art to construct a synthetic gene for 
biosynthesis of that protein."97 In other words, the Board, applying 
biological principles, reasoned that the corresponding link between a 
gene (i.e., DNA sequence) and its encoded protein via the genetic code 
renders the gene obvious when the amino acid sequence is known. 
However, the Federal Circuit does not see it this way. According to 
the court, even if one skilled in the art who knew the structure of the 
protein could use the genetic code to hypothesize possible structures for 
the corresponding gene, because of the "degeneracy"98 of the genetic 
code there are a vast number of nucleotide sequences that might code for 
a specific protein. 99 The Federal Circuit, instead of following the Board 
by applying biological principles, applied principles of structural 
chemistry, which led to a finding of nonobviousness. 
For purposes of this Article, ·there are two points to be made here. 
First, a different legal result is reached depending upon which teclmolog-
ical practice is employed (i.e., biology or structural chemistry) because 
each practice has its own language and relates to the patent code 
differently. Second, the Federal Circuit's use of structural chemistry is 
dubious. While it is true that the degeneracy of the genetic code gives 
rise to a vast possibility of encoding nucleic acids, bioteclmological 
investigators have devised certain strategies, which are well known in the 
art, to facilitate the isolation of the desired gene once the amino acid 
sequence is known. 100 This illustrates the application of the techno-
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 43. For a history of the Board, see Michael W. Blommer, 
The Board ofPatentAppeals and Infeiferences, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N BULL., Dec. 
1992, at 188; Paul J. Federico, The Board of Appeals 1861-1961, 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 
691 (1961); Paul J. Federico, Evolution ofPatentOfficeAppeals, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 
838 (1940). 
97. Ex parte Hudson, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1322, 1324 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interfer-
ences 1990). 
98. "Degeneracy" refers to the fact that several different codons or nucleotide 
sequences may encode for the same amino acid. See ADAMS ET AL., supra note 95, at 519-
24. 
99. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993);/n re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
100. See Ex parte DeueL 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 
1993), rev'd 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Board stated: 
Though those skilled in the art may be unaware of the exact 
chemical structure of a gene they are a ware that it is composed of an 
unknown but established, relatively unchanging array of nucleotides 
which code for the particular protem. Importantly, they are also 
aware that the gene will hybridize with another DNA having the same 
assemblage of adjacent nucleotides for at least a portion ofthe gene. 
Those skilled in the art are also aware of established procedures for 
isolating the gene using the hybridization phenomenon. One such 
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patent dynamic: -better understanding and application of the interplay 
between the patent code and the relevant technological practice (i.e., the 
scientific principles underlying biotechnology and the indirect effect on 
research and development, 101 leads to a validity determination that 
maintains the legitimacy of our patent system - in this case, the 
obviousness of a DNA sequence. 
Additionally, accompanying this dynamic is the evolution of various 
rules and customs102 pertaining to claim drafting, 103 i.e., the "patent 
procedure, a probing technique, is taught in the [prior art] .... 
, . . Indeed, probing appears to have become so routine that 
appellants' specification leaves the reader to determine the probing 
technique used and says nothing about the initial probe .... 
Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448, 1450. See als_o Anita Varma & David 
Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance Between Biotech 
Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 53 (1996)( criticizing the Federal Circuit's 
treatment of the DNA/protein issue as it relates to obviousness). 
101. In Ex parte Deuel, the Board expressed concern about the scope of a patent 
covering a DNA sequence. According to the Board: 
When a patent issues on the DNA which codes for the protein, the 
patent owner receives the exclusive right to the DNA and, practically 
speaking, to the preparation of commercial quantities of the protein 
which requires the DNA for its production. This is true whether or 
not isolation of the DNA is accomplished via routine or extraordinary 
techniques. 
Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447. See also Varma & Abraham, supra note 
100, at 55 (regarding "the obviousness relationship between DNA and proteins, the Federal 
Circuit's guidance has upset the delicate balance between patentees and the market, and 
threatens the development of DNA-based technology.") .. 
102. As early as 1948, patent claims were characterized as "highly technical in many 
respects as the result of special doctrines relating to the proper form and scope of claims that 
have been developed by the courts and Patent and Trademark Office." William Redin 
Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MicH. L. REv. 7 55, 7 65 
(1948). 
103. See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 
457,488 (1938). Deller adds: 
Along with the development of the importance of the claim, there was 
another far-reaching change in the attitude of both the Patent Office 
and the courts as to the way in which claims should be drawn and 
interpreted, To appreciate this change, it is necessaiy to go back to 
the fundamental principles underlying the -definition of what is new 
and the various modes of distinguishing what is riew from what is 
old. Generally speaking, compliance with the requirements ofthe 
early statutes for a distinction between new and th.e old was not 
perfect. The problem of discovering in the early patents what 
invention was involved was a burden which was carried by the courts 
and the public. The desirability of shifting this burden to the Patent 
Office and to the patentee himself soon became apparent. 
1 ANTHONY WILUAM DELLER, PATENT CLAI!viS 11 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis added). 
In the leading ~tiSe on claim drafting, Faber states that '~claim drafting practices and 
538 Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology [Vol. 10 
lexicon." Claim drafting is an art with a unique vocabulary. Indeed, 
there is a bargain inherent in our patent system whereby, in return for the 
right to exclude others frpm making, using, or selling the claimed 
invention, the inventor must disclose to society, through the use of 
techniques ... have grown up over the years by case law, [PTO] rules and memoranda, and, 
simply, custom .... " R.C. FABER, LANDIS ON TIIE MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAllvi 
DRAFTING at xv (3d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). Examples of these "practices and 
techniques" are: 
[1] [T]he standard custom as to sentence construction is that 
each claim must be the direct object of a single sentence, 
however long, beginning with a standard introductory 
phrase such as "I claim," "The invention claimed is," or 
the equivalent. 
[2] When only one claim is presented, no numeral is used 
. . . . When more than one claim is submitted, each claim 
must start with an Arabic numeral (rule 75(f)). The 
claims must be numbered consecutively, and good practice 
dictates that the claims be grouped and numbered in a 
logical order for consideration (rule 75(f)). The usual 
practice is to begin with the broadest claim and proceed to 
the narrowest, and to group similar types of claims 
together. 
[3] Most claims have "preambles," or introductory statements, 
the purpose of which is to name or define the thing that is 
to be claimed. 
[4] Most ordinary combination claims require a transitional 
word or phrase between the preamble (naming the thing to 
be claimed) and the body of the claim (defining what the 
elements or parts of the thing are). Two recommended 
forms of transition that can be employed for most claims 
are the phrases: "which comprises" or "comprising." The 
word "comprises" has been construed to mean, in patent 
law, "including the following elements but not excluding 
others." 
[5] Other transitions have more limited meanings. They are 
used primarily in chemical cas~s . . . . "Consisting" or 
"consisting o(" especially in a mechanical claim, means 
that the claim covers devices that have the recited ele-
ments, and no more .... 
[6] The body of a combination claim ... comprises: (a) a 
recitation of"elements" of parts ofthe c_cimbination; and 
(b) adescription.of how the elements cooperate with .one 
another structUrally, physically, or functionally, to make 
uptheoperative combination recited inthe preamble. 
Idat 5, 7, 8, 11, 12,14 (footnotes omitted). See generally EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENT 
CLAUvi DRAFTING (2d ed.l952). ) 
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claims, what she has invented. Needless to say, the meaning ascribed to 
and the validity of claims, and the entity charged with such tasks, are 
instrumental to a modern patent system. 
This leads directly to the question this Article examines: who is in 
the best position to-apply the modalities in the contextofpatent law. If 
. the "most important aspect of the modalities is that it is only through 
their use that the truth or falsehood oflegal claims is determined" 104 and 
legitimacy maintained, niy concern is whether the PTO or the courts 
should be the gatekeepers of legitimacy. Before this is explored, 
however, I will demonstrate how the modalities would be applied in a 
typical validity determination. 
2. Applying the Modalities 
The following hypothetical will facilitate an understanding of how 
the modalities would be applied in a patent validity determination. 
Marge invents a chemical composition. She files a patent applica-
tion for her invention with the PTO. Marge claims a composition of 
matter comprising: (1) ARO 1 Oxide; and (2) CRO 1 Oxide. 105 Her 
invention relates to steel compositions. In her patent, Marge asserts that 
the use of CRO 1 Oxide enhances the strength of the final steel product. 
After examining the relevant prior art (a Scientific American publication 
and a 1988 French chemical composition patent), the examiner issues the 
patent to Marge as U.S. Patent No. 111,111,111 ('' 111 patent"). Three 
years into the life of the patent, Marge discovers that her competitor, 
Homer, is making a form of steel using elements similar to those which 
are claimed in the '111 patent. Following further investigation, Marge 
writes Homer a cease and desist letter asserting that Homer is infringing 
her patent. Not surprisingly, Homer files an action seeking declaratory 
judgment, asserting that the '111 patent is invalid because it is obvious 
in light of a Steel Monthly article-and the above mentioned 1988 French 
patent. The district court judge bifurcates the issues of validity and 
infringement because a finding of invalidity would be dispositive.· 
In this example, the decisionmaker is called upon to interpret the 
meaning of both the claim and the statutory law in order to evaluate 
Homer's obviousness assertion. The modalities focus the grammarian on 
the determinations used to establish whether this is a legitimate 
proposition of law. 
104. Patterson, Conscience, supra note 17, at 294. 
105. A typical, yet simplistic, claim for Marge's invention may read: 
I claim a composition of matter, comprising: 
a. ARO l Oxide; and 
b. CROl Oxide. 
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The Supreme Court, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 106 articulated 
how § 103 should be approached. According to the Court: 
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are 
to be determined; .differences·. between the. prior. art .and 
the claims. at issue are to ascertained; and the level of 
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. · Against this 
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the 
subject matter is determined. 107 
Thus, the grammarian must: (1) determine the "scope and content 
of the prior art"; (2) ascertain the meaning of the patent claim at issue; 
(3) ascertain the differences between the claim and prior art; (4) ascertain 
a "person of ordinary skill in the art"; and (5) ask whether the claimed 
invention would have been "obvious" to a person of ordinary skill in the 
art. 
The textual modality encourages examination of the statute 
embodying the obviousness requirement: 
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and 
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time of the invention 
was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains.108 
The textualist must also look to. Marge's patent for linguistic clues about 
the breadth of the claim. The grammarian must also turn to other 
modalities, either explicitly or implicitly, to determine the obviousness 
of the claim. 
The historical modality guides the. grammarian to the legislative 
history of § 103 in order to better understand congressional intention. It 
will also encourage the grammarian to consult the history of steel 
compositions, where she may find that there is a history of using 
equivalent chemicals. Finally, she may examine tl1e claim drafting rules 
and customs, and conclude that the patent was drafted narrowly. 
The techno-patent modality will lead the grammarian to question the 
effects of particular patentability decisions on the steel industry and how 
those decisions will affect future research and development decisions. 
106. 383 U.S. l (1965). 
107. Id. at 17. 
108. 35 U.S:C. § 103 (1994). 
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She should pay special attention to the unique characteristics of the 
technological practice, e.g., rapid change and specialized jargons. 
The point is that the application of ~e various modalities illuminate 
how the legal language (e.g., "obvious") and technological language 
(e.g., "CROl Oxide")are used in the relevant cultural context and how 
they relate to each other. 
B. The PTO as Grammarian 
My thesis requires that the grammarian understands, or at least is 
institutionally positioned to understand, the relationship between patent 
and technical language on the one hand and the cultures to which they 
belong on the other. 109 That is, the grammarian maneuvers within the 
constantly evolving patent and technological realms, wherein reside 
activities pertinent to the respective practices of these realms. In short, 
the grammarian is well-equipped to apply the modalities.-
The PTO as grammarian, it seems to me, has greater access to 
relevant epistemic considerations than the courts. 110 It is better posi-
tioned to act as a gatekeeper of the patent and technological lexicons, 
with each examiner and Boardm member (within a technological center) 
assuming the role of a lexicologist. h1 other words, the PTO should have 
primary responsibility for applying the modalities. 
109. Keith Lehrer writes: 
A theory of knowledge need not be a theory about the meaning of 
episternic words any more than it need be a theory about how people 
come to know what they do. Instead, it may be one explaining what 
conditions must be satisfied and how they may be satisfied in order 
for a person to know something. 
KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 5 (1990). Patterson concurs: 
In epistemology, ... debate has shifted from questions regarding the 
indubitable grounds for knowledge to an attempt to specifY the 
conditions under· which one can rightly claim to have knowledge. 
The inclination to ask, not for the grounds of knowledge, but for the 
conditions under which assertions of knowledge will be accepted is 
informed by a distinct view of the relationship between language and 
the world. 
Patterson, Law's Pragmatism, supra note 15, at 938. 
ll 0. A typical example of episternic considerations are the factors that characterize a 
person of ordinary skill in the art. The factors include: (1) the education3.llevel of the 
inventor, (2) the various prior art approaches employed; (3) the types of problems 
encountered in the art, ( 4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; ( 5) the sophistica-
tion of the technology involved; and (6) the educational background of those actively 
working in the field. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 
F.2d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
111. See· supra note.96 and accompanying text. 
i~: )j 
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The PTO, more than any other patent related institution, understands 
that the grammar of patent law and technological development are ever 
in flux, their respective terms constantly changing. 112 Defining such 
terms from a. perspective external to patent law and the relevant techno-
patent dyUamic 'is a·virtually.impossiple·:task. The>PTO possesses the 
institutional capacity to engage the various technological industries and 
develop an expertise for the technical language, 113 and although a court 
. may be able to learn this language, the PTO examiner has experience 
with the relevant technology. Indeed, the PTO as envisioned possesses 
a heightened form of cognizance or, in the words of Wittgenstein, 
"perspicuous representation."114 For these reasons, the PTO is the 
ultimate inside player, and is best suited to be the grammarian of patent 
law. 
This does not diminish the significance of the federal district courts 
or the Federal Circuit, nor should there cease to be any type of judicial 
review. Indeed, I would not advocate a role for the PTO in determining 
whether an accused device infringes a claimed invention; 115 rather, I am 
arguing that the PTO, subject to deferential judicial review, should be the 
primary grammarian responsible for determining the meaning and 
112. This understanding is critical in the adjudicatory context. Professor Stroup writes: 
[A]s Wittgenstein suggests, when the rules become more important 
than the context in which they are applied, 'things do not turn out as 
we had assumed.' When the context in which legal words are used 
changes drastically, cases with similar factual situations may not at 
all be alike, and to treat them as such might serve neither justice nor 
logic. Indeed, when legal language 'goes on a holiday' and the judge 
rigidly applies precedent without consideration for the language-
game, or context, in which the words of sUU:ute. or the Constitution are 
being used, he may well find himself entangled in his own rules, 
making distinction after distinction in order to make the fa~tual 
situation fit the precedent, and in the end, clearly losing touch with 
thereal needs of the community. 
Daniel G. Stroup, Law and Language: Cardozo's Jurisprudence and Wittgenstein 's 
Philosophy, 18 VAL. U. L. REv. 331, 352 (1984). 
113. WriTGENSTEIN, INvEsTIGATIONS, supra riote 32, § 199 ("To understand a sentence 
' means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a 
technique."). 
114. Id § 122. Describing wlttgenstein's "perspicuous representation," Thomas Eisele 
states: 
So the challenge here is to bring all of this -what we have done and 
said, our actions and activities, and their imagined alternatives - to 
cbnsciousness, to conscious inspection and reflection; then, perhaps 
we shall see what it is that we are doing and how we manage to do it. 
Eisele, supra note 31, at 34. 
115. This is especially true in light of the equitable nature of the doctrine of equivalents. 
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validity of patent claim(s) prior to the infringement analysis, which 
should remain within the province of the court. 116 
1. Wittgenstein and Claim Interpretation 
I am suggesting that the PTO should be given primary responsibility 
for determining the validity of patent claims. A validity detenn:in,ation 
involves two steps. First, the claims (e.g., Marge's 'Ill patent) are 
construed; and second, the prior art (e.g., the Steel Monthly article and 
the French patent) is compared to the construed claims to discern 
whether the claims are met by the prior art (i.e., is the invention claimed 
in Marge's '111 patent anticipated or obvious in view of the prior ar-t).m 
Thus, the initial inquiry focuses on the meaning of claim language, 
which I have argued should not be viewed in isolation; rather, the claim 
language should be examined in the light of relevant technological 
practice and applicable patentability provisions. This initial inquiry is 
very important, for it is frequently dispositive and often leads to foregone 
conclusions with respect to validity and infringement determinations, 
inasmuch as the parties base their entire case on their respective versions 
of what a claim means. ns In other words, " [ o ]nee you have construed 
116. Whether a judge or jury should decide the issue of infringement is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
117. See Beachcombers v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994); Elmer & HTH, Inc. v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). As with validity, an infringement determination also entails claim construction. In 
Snellman v. Ricoh, the Federal Circuit said: . 
The determination of infringement is a two-step process. First, the 
meaning of the claim alleged to have been infringed must be 
determined.· Second, the alleged ·infringing device must be compared 
to the claims to determine whether the claims cover the device, either 
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 286 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also Smithkline 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. HeltmaLab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
118. See, e.g., Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) ("Improper claim construction can distort the entire infringement analysis."); MCV, 
Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Although we do 
not reach it, the dispositive issue on the merits would be the definition of the invention, 
.... "); Paeco, Inc. v. Applied Moldings, Inc., 562 F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Of the 
several complex questions concerning the proper interpretation of Claim 2, one is 
dispositive."); Elf AtochemN. Am., Inc. v. Lib bey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 859 
(D. Del.l995) ("Not surprisingly, resolution of the claim interpretation issue often resolves 
the infringement issue, as it will-in this case."); Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., 
L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 (D. Del. 1995) ("[C]laim construction more often than not 
determines_theout<;ome on infringement."). See also Edward G. Poplawski & Paul D. 
Tripodi, II, The Impact of Federal Circuit Precedent on the "On-Sale" and "Public-Use" 
Bars to Patentability, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 2351,2391 n.46 (1995) ("Because in many cases 
a trier of fact's determination of the meaning of the claims may be dispositive of 
544 Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology [Vol. 10 
the scope of the daim, that's the end of the game."119 However, the 
degree of difficulty of the second step of the validity determination 
should not be understated, for the claim language must be compared to 
the prior art, whether it is a publication or a patent. The language of this 
prior art must be ii.ven meaning; and therefore, like the claim language 
to which it is being compared, should be viewed in the light of relevant 
industry practices at the time the prior art was created (i.e., the effective 
date). 
a. The PTO and the Technological Community 
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 120 the Supreme Court 
held that a judge is better able than a jmy to decide issues of claim 
construction. This holding has led to so-called "Marlanan hearings," 
whereby the claims of the patent-in-suit are construed before the issues 
of validity and infringement are tried. 121 · 
However, one cannot define the words ''obvious" and "CROl 
Oxide" ·without some contextual setting. To ask what "obvious" and 
"CROI Oxide" mean in a vacuum is akin to Socrates inquiring as to the 
meaning of virtue. There is no Platonic precision in patent law. Marge's 
claimed invention must be viewed, inter alia, in light of the prior art and 
of a person of ordinary skill in the art- that much the statute(§ 103) 
tells us. However, our fuzzy "obviousness" picture needs more 
resolution. One can gradually add resolution by focusing on how the 
terms "obvious" or "CROl Oxide" are used. Recall Wittgenstein's 
assertion that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language"; 122 and 
his belief that "the teaching of language is not explanation, but 
training." 123 
Indeed, there is a relativistic flavor to claim interpretation insofar as 
the meaning of claim language is relative to, and inseparable from, the 
technological context from which it arises. Claim language, like any 
infringement, and to a somewhat lesser ~tvalidity, bench trials and summary judgments 
can be expected to increase."); Kenneth E. Krosin & Timothy R: DeWitt, En Bane 
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 423 PLI/Pat 831, 848 (1995) ("Since many cases are 
deciqed on the basis of claim construction, those cases likely will be decided in the 
summary judgment phase."). 
l i 9. This ~tenient was made by a patent expert in the private bar. Linda Greenhouse, _ 
Ruling Curbs Jury's Role on Patents, N.Y. Tnvrns, April24, 1996, at Dl (quoting Bo 
Pasternak of Choate, Hall & Stewart in Boston). 
120. 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996). 
121. See, e.g., Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 798, 802 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850. 
122. WmGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 43. 
123. Id § 5. 
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language, is inherently indeterminate; 124 as .Learned Hand appropriately 
quipped, claims sometimes appear to be a '"wilderness ofwords."125 Due 
to this lack of self-evidence, parties frequently offer expert testimony as 
to the meaning of .the claim in issue;126 One Ph.D. after another is 
ushered before the court, each advancing her own narrative account of 
the meaning of the claim. 127 · 
·This notion of relativism was collfronted by WittgeD.stein, .for. he 
posited that the meaning of a word is in the activity that gave birth to the 
word. Again, the "meaning of a word is its use in the language," not "in 
the mind." 128 Borrowing a phrase from commercial law, to ascertain the 
meaning of claim language the grammarian must look to the parties' 
"course of conduct," or more specifically, "technological practice." 129 
The grammarian should be a participant in the technological practice 
and be familiar with patent law and how it applies to the claim language 
representative of that practice. 130 As such, a strong argument can be 
124. As Learned Hand memorably stated about the claims of a particular patent: "It 
takes the scholastic ingenuity of a St. Thomas with the patience of a yogi to decipher their 
meaning .... " Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 229 F. 999, l 00 l (2d 
Cir. 1916 ). The Elf Atochem court stated that: 
If the meaning of words in a claim to describe an invention ... are 
not in dispute then claim construction is a fairly simple process. In 
practice, however, parties rarely agree as to the meaning of the claim 
terms. . . . As to these words, the patent owner will propose a 
meaning that precisely describes the accused product or process. The 
accused infringer will do just the opposite, 
894 F. Supp. at 858-59. 
125. Victor Talking Mach., 229 F. at 1001. 
126. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 887 F.2d 1070, 
1076 {Fed. Cir. 1989) ('The purpose of expert testimony is to provide assistance to the court 
iri understanding, when the claims are technologically complex or linguistically obscure, 
how a technician in tht.l field, reading the patent, would understand the claims."). 
127. See Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 {D. 
Del. 199 5) ("Much of the trial testimony consisted of competing expert explanations of 
claim constructions."). 
128. WITTGENSTEIN'S LECTURES AT CAMBRIDGE, 1930-32, at 25 (Desmond Lee ed. 
1980). 
129. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
130. Thomas Eisele states: 
[O]ur ·practical mastery of the institution and technique of 
language - of relating words to the world (and the world to 
Words)- consists in knowing our ways around this enormously 
complicated and intricate form of life, being able to negotiate its 
terms and passages and conditions, knowing how to call upon and 
invoke (or how to withhold appropriately) words made available to us 
by our language in the conteXts and circumStances presented us in this 
world:>These anticipated and ensuing norms of our natural language 
(which Wrttgenstein calls our "criteria" and "grammar") instantiate 
and inscribe our linguisti~ practice. They are that we need to get to 
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made that the PTO should be the grammarian, for the PTO is institution-
ally positioned and trained in the relevant patent and technological 
activities. 131 The PTO is contextually embedded and provides litigants 
with a contextual forum imbued with community custom. The PTO 
understands that meaning is· culturally related. Even if one argues that 
a judge has the benefit of expert witnesses ml:~ that he will be better able 
to assess the coherence of expert testimony than a participant trained in 
the relevant technological practice, the PTO, as I envision it, is still 
superior because it could dispense with the inevitably partisan expert 
witnesses. The PTO adjudicator himself would be, or be assisted-by, an 
impartial expert with greater objectivity. Furthermore, vesting validity 
determinations with the PTO would provide for a greater degree of 
certainty early in the enforcement process. Knowing what the claim 
means at an early stage, coupled with narrow judicial review, may have 
the effect of inducing the parties to settle. 
In deciding that "judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the 
acquired meaning of patent terms," the Mar/anan 132 Court re.asoned that: 
The construction of written instruments is one of those 
things that judges often do and are likely to do better 
than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent 
construction in particular "is a special occupation, 
requiring, like all others, special training and practice. 
The judge, from his training and discipline, is more 
likely to give a proper interpretation to such instru-
ments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to 
be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be 
expected to be." 133 
know better, that of which we need to get a more perspicuous view. 
Eisele, supra note 31, at 36. 
131. Karl Llewellyn, in the context of commercial law, understood that commercial 
practices are inseparable from their social context. 
Like Wittgenstein, Llewellyn was concerned with the relationship 
between words and the activities of which they are a part. Llewellyn 
argued that in applying commercial standards, meinbers not of the 
community at large but of the class of merchants were most likely to 
reach valid judgments, because these persons wete most familiar with 
the nuances of everyday, evolving commercial practices. 
Dennis Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of 
Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REv. 169, 206 
(1989). 
132. Mar~anv. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). 
133. Id at 1395 (citation omitted) (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No~ 10,740)). 
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Although I agree with the Court that a judge is better suited than a jury 
to ascertain the meaning of claim language, I would argue that the PTO 
is "likely to do better than jurors [and judges]" 134 because the PTO, 
unlike the. federal. jucjiciary}~;; employs individuals with "training· in 
exegesis" in the fields of patent law and technology; 136 and these 
individuals· have "special training and practice'.'.that places .them at the 
center ofthe techno..;patent dynamic .. Indeed, patent law.and technologi-
cal development are nothing more than linguistic practices ·in which PTO 
examiners are trained. 
The Court reasoned further that "in these cases a jury's capabilities 
. to reflect community standards [are] much less significant than a 
trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall 
stnicture of the patent." 137 I would agree with the Court if what they 
mean by "community" is Main Street U.S.A., for such a community is 
essentially irrelevant to claim interpretation. However, in some sense, 
134. Difficult cases and issues have always plagued the judiciary. As Justice Jackson 
stated: the Supreme Court acts "in these matters not by authority of our competence but by 
force of our commissions." West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
640(1943). 
135. One C!Lfi argue that the Federal Circuit was created as a specialized court armed 
with the req~isite expertise to handle patent cases. However, I do not believe that this 
argument carries the day. First, a majority of judges on the Federal Circuit possessed little 
if any technological and patent experience before coming to the bench. Second, the 
legislative history makes it clear that it was not the intention of Congress to make the 
Federal Circuit a "specialized court." See H.R. REP. No. 97-312 (1981). 
By combining the jurisdiction of the two existing courts along with 
certain limited grants of new jurisdiction, the bill creates a new 
intermediate appellate court markedly less specialized than either of 
its predecessors and provides the judges of the new court with a 
breadth of jurisdiction that rivals in its variety that of the regional 
courts of appeal. The proposed new court is not a "specialized 
court." Its jurisdiction is not limited to one type of case, or even two 
or three types of cases. Rather, it has a varied docket spanning a 
broad range of legal issues and types of cases. 
Id at 19. See also S. REP. No:97-275, at6 (1981). The primary reason behind the creation 
of the Federal Circuit was to prevent forum-shopping and to promote patent uniformity. See 
H.R REP. No. 97~312 at 20-22 (1981 ). These policies are not frustrated by incorporating 
the PTO into the enforcement mechanism. Lastly, focusing on the Federal Circuit ignores 
the significant advantage (e.g., inducing settlement) of having certainty early on in the 
enforcement process. 
136. See Victor G. Savikas, Survey Lets Judges Render Some Opinions About the 
Patent Bar, NAT'L, Jan. 18, 1993, at S7, cited with approval in Motsenbocker, supra note 
26, at 419 ('U.S. District Court judges often do not have an understanding of the technical 
issues involved until they are well into the patent trial .... "). According to Motsenbocker, 
''Savikas surveyed over 700 U.S.District Court judges and found that 41% felt that patent 
cases should be tried in a special patent court. Thirty-nine percent also felt that patent cases 
are too difficult to be tried by jury." I d. at 419, n.l45. 
137. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc;; 116 S. Ct 1384, 1395 (1996). 
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community standards are essential in ascertaining the meaning of claim 
and technical language. The relevant community is the particular 
technological community in question, and neither judges nor juries are 
better able than the -PTOto "reflect [technological] community stan-
. dards." 
·With that in mind, the entity charged with determining validity 
should be able to transcend the technology and fcimiliarize itself with 
industry practice and language, and how they relate to patent law. The 
economic literature on patents posits that the research and development 
decisions of certain industries are influenced by the prospect of 
patentability and by patentability standards. 138 This is part of the techno-
patent dynamic. As Professor Merges states: "Indeed, because the 
[patentability] standard will influence [research and development] 
decisions, courts charged with interpreting the nonobviousness standard 
ought . . . to modify it where necessary to carry out the underlying goals 
of the patent system," 139 
Although the courts should have an understanding of the impact of 
patentability standards, instead of speaking in terms of the "courts 
charged with interpreting" these standards, it makes more sense from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective to charge the PTO with giving meaning to 
words such as "obvious" or "CROI Oxide." If language is learned 
through training and words are defined through use, then one of the 
major advantages of having the PTO serve as the grammarian is the fact 
that federal district courts, like all Article III courts, are institutionally 
138. See supra note 2. 
139. See Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 2,.at 12. 
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removed from the day to day operations of the private industrial sector140 
and deal with patent problems only episodically.141 
The PTO has the institutional capability to conduct public hearings 
specifically targeted to particular industries. 142 This mechanism allows 
140. Stephen Carter refers to this as the "problem ofPetrushevsky's watch." This 
problem relates to a story by the Russian writer Daniil Kharms about Pushkin. "Once 
Petrushevsky broke his watch and sent for Pushkin. Pushkin came, looked at 
Petrushevsky's watch, and put it back on the chair. 'What do you say, Brother Pushkin?' 
Petrushevsky asked. 'The wheels stopped going round,' Pushkin said." Daniil Kharms, 
Anecdotes About Pushkin's Life, in RussiA's LOST LITERATURE OF THE ABSURD 66, 66 
(George Gibian ed., trans., 1971 ), quoted in Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Acijudication, and 
Petrnshevsky 'sWatch: Some Notes on the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA L. REV. 129 
(1992). 
After this narration, Carter goes on to say: 
I sometimes share this story with my students in Contracts when we 
talk about the ability of courts to stand outside of an industry and to 
figure out what the custom of dealing is in order to imply terms in a 
contract. The courts, I explain, might be able to tell whether the 
wheels are turning, but I am not sure that they can tell why or why 
not .... 
. . . Even courts inclined to enforce private orderings might not 
be very good at anthropology. The judge, after all, is on the outside, 
looking in .... [A] court is called upon to work out not only the 
conduct or custom of the parties with respect to each other, but the 
custom of dealing within the industry. Although lawsuits in which 
industry customs come into question are, of course, quite common, 
I have always wondered, during my years of teaching first-year 
Contracts, whether the courts really know what they are talking about 
-not because the judges lack competence, but because the further 
beyond the facts of the case they go, the weaker their sources of 
information are likely to be. 
Carter, supra, at 132. 
141. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 
2071 (1990 ). Sunstein notes: 
Sometimes regulation is made more difficult because of the pervasive 
problem of changed circumstances. New developments involving 
technological capacity, economics, [or] the international situation ... 
may affect regulatory performance. Congress is unable to amend 
every statute to account for these changes, a situation that creates a 
genuine problem for those who must apply the statute .... In these 
circumstances, a grant of interpretive authority to administrators, 
allowing them to take changed circumstances into consideration, 
seems to be a valuable if partial corrective. 
Id at 2088-89. See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpreta-
tions of Law, 1989 DUKEL.J. 511, 517-18. 
142. The PTO has held public hearings on patent protection for nucleic acid sequences, 
medical therapeutic and diagnostic methods, biotechnology, and computer software. See 
Notice ofHea.ririgs and Request for Comments on Issues Relating to Patent Protection for 
Nucleic Acid Sequences, 61 Fed. Reg. 9980 (1996); Notice ofHearingsand Request for 
Comments on Issues Relating to Patent Protection for Therapeutic and Diagnostic Method, 
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the PTO to familiarize itself with the nature of the technology, its 
language, and its culture. 143 As Wittgenstein noted, "[o]ne cannot guess 
how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that." 144 
This point cannot be overemphasized. The pharmaceutical, biotechnol-
ogy, computer software, and chemical indlistries, to name but a few, 
spend billions of dollars annually on research and development. Each of 
thes·e industries is unique and each employs different ·and .. constantly 
evolving languages and methodologies. 145 It is virtually impossible to 
61 Fed. Reg. l0320 (l996); Notice ofPublic Hearings and Request for Comments on Patent 
Protection for Biotechnological Inventions, 59 Fed. Reg. 45267 (1994 ); Public Hearings and 
Request for Comments on Patent Protecti9n for Software-Related Inventions, 58 Fed. Reg. 
66347 (1993); see alsoPatentandTrademarkO.ffice: Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San 
Diego Hearing, 48 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGIIT J. (BNA) 677 (Oct. 20, 1994) 
(reporting that witnesses criticized PTO biotech examiners); Patent and Trademark Office: 
ImprovedPatentsforSoftware Urged at Second Round ofHearings, 41 PAT. TRADEMARK 
& CoPYRIGIITJ. (BNA) 357 (Feb. 17, 1994 ); Patent and Trademark Office: PTO Hears 
from Silicon Valley on Patent Protection for Software, 4 7 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGIIT 
J. (BNA) 307 (Feb. 3, 1994 ). The software hearings matured into a set of examination 
guidelines, see Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 
7478 (1996). See generally, US Patent and Trademark Office: Public Hearings 
<http://www.uspto.gov/ web/offices/com/hearings/> (making available transcripts from 
recent hearings). 
14 3. Bruce Lehma.n, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, states: 
Under my regime, we have instituted this policy of public hearings 
and [on a policy basis] we can reach out to ... the world in a way 
that is entirely impossible for the (Federal Circuit]. All the [Federal 
Circuit] can do is all that it is ethically permitted to do. That is to 
read the briefs and listen to oral arguments of the parties . . . . This 
is not remotely close to the fact, information, [and] policy gathering 
apparatus that we have here [at the PTO], where not only can we rely 
on our internal staff of literally thousands of technical peopLe, 
examiners and lawyers, but also our capacity to reach out to have 
public hearings; to meet'and talk wi:tli people in the bar, all of these 
various groups that deal with this office. 
Interview with the Hon. Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commis-
sioner of the Patent and Trademark Office, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1994) (transcript 
on file with theHarvardJoumal ofLaw and Technology). 
144. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 340. 
14 5. Henryk Stolimowski has discerned "specific patterns of technological thinking for 
some branches of technology." Henryk Stolimowski, The Structure of Thinking in 
Technology, in PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 42, 46-48 (1983 ). He notes that, "[i]n general, 
it seems to me that spectfic branches of/earning originate and condition specific modes of 
thinking, develop and adhere to categories through which they can bestexpress their 
content andby means of which they can further progress." Id at 46. He uses microbiology 
as an example "to spell out some of the structures or patterns of thinking in technology." 
Id at 46. To wit: 
The microbiologist makes daily observations of microscopic sections 
which are quite simple from a certain point of view. Now what is a 
oiicroscopic section, forexample, of a diphtheria culture? It is, in the 
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point out a characteristic common to all technologies. Only the PTO is 
positioned to engage these industries and discern their respective 
technological languages in the context of the patent lexicon. 
b. The PTO and Expertise 
Agency expertise has long been · a justification for according 
deference. 146 Expertise should also be a strong factor in deciding who 
should serve as the grammarian. 147 It is axiomatic that validity determi-
nations are highly complex and require a great deal of technical 
expertise. The subject matter of a claimed invention can range from 
aircraft engines to pha..-maceuticals to computer softWare, and an 
understanding of each technology and how it relates to the law is critical 
to the meaning of the claim language. 
This is why the PTO, an institution that is constantly using the legal 
and technical words, and· whose employees are trained in the relevant 
technologies, 148 is best suited to be the Wittgensteinian grammarian. 149 
layman's language, a specific configuration of certain forms which 
possess characteristic structures. This is how far we can go in 
describing the phenomenon verbally. In other words, no amount of 
verbal explanation will render it possible for the layman and generally 
for the untrained person to recognize the diphtheria culture by mere 
description. At first, the layman and beginning students of microbiol-
ogy are simply unable to perceive what is there to be seen. After 
some period of training they do perceive and are in fair agreement as 
to what they see. The ability to recognize certain microscopic 
structures is thus peculiar to students of microbiology. 
Id at46 (emphasis added). 
Stolimowski summarizes as follows: 
Id at48. 
[f]o think in terms specific for a given discipline is to think in those 
terms that (I) determine the lirles of investigation within this 
discipline; (2) account for the historical development of this disci-
pline; [and] (3) explain the recent growth of the discipline. 
146. See Chevron U.S.A; Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense CounciL Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865 (1984) (''In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable 
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the 
regulatory scheme is technical and complex .... "); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 ·U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) ("[A]gency expertise is one of the principal 
justifications behind Chevrandeference."). For a detailed treatment of the deference issue, 
see generally Nard, supra note 30. 
14 7. As Learned Hand stated: "To judge on our own that this or that new assemblage 
of old factors was, or was not, 'obvious' is to substitute our ignorance for the acquaintance 
with the subject of those who were familiar with it." Reiner v. Leon, 285 F.2d 501, 504 (2d 
Cir; 1960). 
148. As Schwartz explains: 
The PTO conducts initial and continuing training of examiners. This 
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In oti.r hypothetical, Marge claimed "a composition of matter, compris-
ing: a) AROl Oxide; and b) CROl Oxide." The PTO examiners and 
Board members trained in chemistry are more likely to have an 
understanding of what "CRO 1 Oxide" is and how it relates to statutory 
terms such as "obvious" than other potential interpreters. At the very 
least, it can be said that the examiners and Board members are "plugged 
in'; to the chemical industry to a greater extent than Article m judges and 
have a better feel for the statutory language as it pertains to the relevant 
industry. 150 
c. The PTO and Certainty 
A system that excludes the PTO from the enforcement mechanism 
and enables courts and juries to second guess the PTO de novo leads to 
considerable uncertainty in one's property interest. The Supreme Court 
spoke about the importance of certainty in Markman: 
"[T]he limits of a patent must be known for the protec-
tion of the patentee, the encouragement of the inven-
tive genius of others and the assurance that the subject 
of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the pub-
lic." Otherwise, a "zone of uncertainty which enter-
prise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of 
infringement claims would discourage invention only 
a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field," 
and "[t]he public [would] be deprived of rights sup-
seventeen examining groups, each headed by a group director. Each 
examining group covers a broad area of technology and has a number 
of subgroups, known as art units, that have responsibility for 
applications whose subject matter falls into subsets of that broad area. 
HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 8 n.35 (1995). 
149. Assistant Secretary Lehman opines: 
I think [that] ... a nonobvious determination ... is so clearly a 
technical determination ... I mean we [the PTO] have 2000 patent 
examiners and in an area of biotechnology, we have over 150 Ph.Ds. 
Now how a judge for the [Federal Circuit], even if they are a patent 
lawyer, can presume to know more about whether something meets 
that nonobviousness test ... than a highly trained, skilled patent 
examiner, often times with a Ph.D., [is beyond me]. 
Interview with Lehman, supra note 143 (third ellipsis in original). 
150. My appraisal ofPTO expertise is ilotto say that the incorporation of the PTO into 
the validity enforcement mechanism is devoid of concerns. For example, there is always 
the risk of agency capture and the prospect of "reverse capture," the latter pertaining to the 
PTO' s alleged lack of technical competence, or, at least, the private bar's perception of 
such. As I mentioned earlier, my proposals would require the PTO to undergo structural and 
qualitative modifications. 
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posed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it 
is that limits these rights." 151 
553 
The Federal Circuit has also Iioted the importance of certainty in 
patent law. As Judge Bryson stated in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, 
Inc.: 
Patent counselors should be able to advise their clients, 
with some confidence, whether to proceed with a 
product or process of a particular kind. The conse-
quences of advice that turns out to be incorrect can be 
devastating, and the costs of uncertainty - unjustified 
caution or the devotion of vast resources to the sterile 
enterprise of litigation - can be similarly destruc-
tive_I52 
Incorporating the PTO into the enforcement mechanism by gi.vmg it 
primary responsibility for validity determination breeds certainty and 
predictability in the commercial and business worlds, rather than '.'the 
sterile enterprise oflitigation." 153 Lastly, parties may be induced to settle 
if they know the meaning of the claims early in the enforcement 
process. 154 
2. Claim Interpretation as a "Language-Game" 
Throughout the last 15 0 years, the institutions of patent law and 
technology have given rise to certain language-games within the culture 
of the PTO and the patent system itself Wittgenstein stressed that "to 
151. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1996)(brackets 
in original) (citations omitted). 
152. 87 F.3d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
153. JudgeS. Jay Plager comments: 
I can't imagine an administrative law arrangement where you get a 
license, a permit, a grant of right, which people can challenge time 
and time again .... It not only surprises me, it amazes me. Why 
would you possibly have a system that gives you a government grant 
which is little more than a right to litigate? That's what it really is -
a federal right to litigate. Well, when I make a great invention I don't 
want a ftllieral right to litigate - I· want a protected property interest 
in that invention. 
S. Jay Plager, An interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, 5 J, PRoPRIETARY Rrs., 
December 1993 at2, 6. 
154. See Part IILB.l.a. 
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imagine a language means to imagine a form of life," 155 and that "the 
term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."156 A 
"form of life" is thus a cultural or social structure in which language-
games are embedded. And, if patent law and technology are "forms of 
life," . then claim interpretation, and research and development schemes 
are "language-games." Thus, patent law and technology can be thought 
of as forms of life and claim interpretation as a language-game subsumed 
therein. 
Professors Baker and Hacker articulate seven elements to a 
Wittgensteinian language-game: 157 (1) words, and sentences formed 
from them, according to combinatorial rules; 158 (2) instruments; 159 (3) 
contex:t; 160 (4) activity of the game; 161 (5) the use, purpose, role and 
function of instruments, words, and sentences; 162 (6) learning games; 163 
and (7) completeness. 164 These elements show that the enterprise of 
claim construction is, itself, a language-game. 
155. WITTGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 19. Thomas D. Eisele interprets 
this statement as Wittgenstein "urging us to remember that, in investigating any means of 
expression, any symbol system, any medium for making meaning - which for me includes 
the law, ... we must see implicit in every nook and cranny of the medium or system the 
lives of its users and inhabitants." Eisele, supra note 31, at 58. 
156. WITTGENSTEIN, INvESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, § 23. 
157. BAKER & HACKER, supra note 43, at 96-97. 
158. The vocabulary and its use in speech acts (moves inthe language-game) is 
specified. ' 
159. These include: (a) gestures, as used in teaching the use of "there", (b) patterns, 
whether samples, words, or figure drawings; and (c) pictures in a table that correlates words 
and pictures. 
160. Baker and Hacker explain "context'' as follows: 
Like any other game, a language-game is "played" in a setting. 
Wittgenstein's stress on the context of the game appears to be 
motivated by the wish to bring to the fore elements of linguistic 
activities which, while not obviously involved in the explanation of 
the meaning of constituent expressions (hence unlike instruments), 
are nevertheless pertinent to their meaning. At its most general the 
notion of context encompasses the presuppositions of meaning. If the 
context were significantly differ~nt, the game would not be played, 
for it would.be pointless. 
BAKER & HACKER, :SUpra note 43, at 96. 
161. This element is related to ''context." As Baker and Hacker explain, "It is in the 
activities ·constitutive of a language-game that the point and purpose of linguistic 
expressions is evident." BAKER& HACKER; supra note 43, at 96. 
162. These features, which must be viewed in contrast to form and structure of 
expressi~n, are· of dmtral importance tb Wittgenstein' s later philosophy: 
163. This feature relates to the training that is necessary to play a language-game (e.g., 
merrtoriiing words). 
164. This feature is meant to emphasize that Wittgenstein's language-games are not 
fragments of a language, but have a sense of completeness. 
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In the hypothetical claim set forth in Part III.A.2, Marge claimed "a 
composition of matter, comprising (a) AROl Oxide; and (b) CROl 
Oxide." Given this, we can analyze the claim language in the context of 
the seven elements listed above. First, it is beyond cavil that Marge's 
claim is made up· of words and· sentences formed according to combina-
torial rules. 165 Second, the construction of a claim involves the use of 
instruments. For example, when interpreting a claim,- one may consider 
the drawings and examples (or samples and models) in the patent 
specification. 166 Third, context is essential to claim interpretation in that 
the claim must "enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains 
. . . to make and use the [claimed invention]." 167 1b:qs, the discernment 
of the technological context (i.e., the "art") is a basic prerequisite of 
claim interpretation. Having ascertained the relevant art (for our 
purposes organic chemistry), a determination of a "person skilled in the 
art" is required. 1bis determination is profoundly contextual. 168 Fourth, 
the activity of claim interpretation can be viewed as the technological 
ethos or technical culture associated with the claim language employed 
by the inventor. 169 Fifth, the use, purpose, role, and function of 
instruments, words and sentences is closely related to the "activity" of 
claim interpretation. Instead of focusing on the form and structure of the 
165. See supra note 103. 
166. See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) ("To ascertain the meaning of the cl3ims, we look to the claim language, the 
specification, and the prosecution history.") Title 35 sets forth the contents of ilie 
specification: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, cbncise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contem-
plated by ilie inventor of cai"rying out his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 {1994). Furthermore, § 113 of the Patent Code states iliat "[t]he applicant 
shall furnish a drawing where necessary for the understanding of the subject matter sought 
t6 be patented." 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1994 ). The applicant may also be required to submit a 
"model of convenient size to exhibit advantageously ilie several parts of his invention." 3 5 
u.s.c. § 114 (1994). . . ··. 
· f67. 35\J.s.c. § 112 {199iq. 
16 8. The factars for determining a person of ordinary skill in the art include: ( 1) ilie 
educational level of the inventor; {2) the various prior art approaches employed; {3) ilie 
types of problems encountered in the art; ( 4) ilie rapidity with which innovations are made; 
{5) the sophistication of the technology involved; and {6) the educational background of 
those actively working in the field. See Orthopedic Equip. Co., v. All Orthopedic 
Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
169. In the relevant art of organic chemistry, the grammarian's concentration may focus 
on the how the industry has used terms such as "AR01 Oxide" and "CROl Oxide .. " An 
inquiry into the research and development mechanism, and how research scientists and 
business executives perceive patentability standards are all part·ofilie activity. 
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claim, the grammarian is more concerned with the use and function of 
the words within the claim. The sixth element highlights the importance 
of training, and this gets to the heart of this Article. It is the PTO that is 
well trained (or at leastbetter trained than the courts) to give meaning to 
patent claims and make validity .determinations. Lastly, the language-
game of claim interpretation is a complete game because it is the claim 
that defines the metes and bounds ·of the invention. 170 Exclusivity does 
not reside beyond the scope of the claim and, as stated, claim interpreta-
tion is usually dispositive with respect to validity and infringement. 171 
Viewing patent law as a language-game shows the inescapably social 
and linguistic nature of patent law. This underlines the need, developed 
throughout this Article, to understand patent law as an artifact of 
language tied to a particular technological community. 
3. A Proposed Procedural Framework 
Although an elaboration of the procedural mechanism that would 
accommodate my proposal is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
worthwhile to introduce an overall structure. 
When a patent is litigated in federal district court, the court should, 
after the discovery phase, transfer the validity determination to the PTO. 
Then, the court should review the PTO' s validity determination under the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard or the framework established in 
Chevron. 172 The validity determination, depending upon the technology, 
will be made by one of the PTO's several technological committees of 
patent validity, comprised of lawyers trained in the relevant technologi-
cal practice. The proceeding should be inter partes in nature. A 
committee member may also be assisted by a patent examiner (an in-
house expert), with the responsibility of exegesis remaining with the 
committee member. 173 
Given that many patent disputes are settled through alternative 
dispute resolution ("ADR"), one may also ask if the Commissioner has 
the authority to delegate examiners to an arbitrator who has requested 
assistance in a particular case. Are there persons in the PTO who could 
assist parties in ADR proceedings? It may be worthwhile to experiment 
with such an adjudicative scheme. Such an experiment may be a good 
way to test,the waters and, perhaps, lead to legislative reform. 
170. See supra note 21. 
171. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. 
172. ·Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984). 
173. Such· a. procedural mechanism would, of course,. require legislation. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this Article, I have attempted to explain how 
Wittgenstein enables us to better understand patent validity determina-
tion and claim interpretation by showing· how meaning is inextricably 
tied with the use of the language at issue. Thus, the heart of a patent 
system will be whichever entity is charged with ascribing meaning to 
claim language. Since the PTO has the expertise accompanying an 
internalperspective, it is best suited (or at least better suited than courts 
and juries) to discern the meaning of claim language and thus should be 
given primary responsibility for determining patent validity. This task 
is accomplished by employing the modalities, especially the techno-
patent dynamic. In order to maintain the legitimacy of our patent system, 
construction of the patent code with reference to the modalities is 
essential. 
